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Terrorism as an “Illegitimate” Subject for Research 
Some of the explanations relate to the very working of the 
disciplines concerned. As terrorism is not included in the 
list of the themes classically recognized as important, it 
has only rarely been listed in the contents of the dictionar-
ies and other traditional publications of the “Encyclope-
dia,” “Manual,” or “State of the Art” type, and the tenden-
cy of academic disciplines to conformism consequently 
made it somewhat unattractive. Students who chose it as 
a subject for a thesis would run the risk of setting them-
selves at a distance from the academic community in their 
discipline and of being less well placed than others on 
the academic market; this risk is all the greater as terror-
ism constitutes a problem at the crossroads of political 
science, history, sociology, and even law and it is difficult 
to set it at the center of any one of these disciplines. As far 
as the recognized researcher – who chose to study it was 
concerned – which was my situation in the 1980s – there 
was the risk of becoming over-conspicuous in relation to 
one’s professional circle and of not obtaining the financ-
ing required for one’s surveys and, furthermore, of being 
the focus of all sorts of doubts and misunderstandings. 
The researchers’ peers questioned whether the researcher 
would not become fascinated by the subject, the public 
authorities questioned what the actual relationship with 
the “terrorists” involved was or expected the researcher 
to turn into a secret service agent, and, finally, the players 
whom he studied were always liable to endeavor to use to 
their advantage the relationship which the researcher was 
attempting to establish with them.
Other explanations concern the phenomenon itself. Ter-
rorism was long considered as sporadic, a stranger to the 
usual working of societies, ultimately as a curiosity, even 
if some of its expressions did impress the contemporary 
public or, thereafter, a few great minds: the Russian popu-
lists who fascinated Albert Camus;2 the French anarchists 
at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twen-
tieth century; the Macedonian, Armenian, and Bosnian 
nationalists, and others in the same period; extreme left 
This article examines the history and the development of terrorism as a research subject for social sciences. It gives an impression of how the subject’s 
theoretical remit has changed over the last decades — explicitly taking into account the characteristics of a modern and global world and their impact 
on current understandings of terrorism. Terrorism is a minor object for the social sciences; it was even long considered “illegitimate” and neglected by 
researchers. There are several explanations for this, which I think my long experience in research authorizes me to evoke here.1
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1 The reader is referred to my publications: Societés 
et terrorisme (Paris: Fayard, 1988), English transla-
tion published by University of Chicago Press, new 
edition 2004; Face au terrorisme (Paris: Liana Lévi, 
1995); and with Dominique Wolton, Terrorisme à 
la Une (Paris: Gallimard, 1987). 
2 Albert Camus, L’homme révolté (Paris: Gal-
limard, Coll. Idées, 1951).
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groups (and sometimes, but less frequently, extreme right 
groups) in several societies during the period of post-in-
dustrialization beginning in the the 1970s; Palestinian 
nationalists and also, in the same period, Basque and Irish 
nationalists, etc. Experiences of this sort have given rise to 
countless texts, but only rarely have they been considered 
primarily from the angle of terrorism and with the tools 
of the social sciences. Apart from news-type texts which 
tend to be dominated by the quest for the sensational, 
they have at best given rise to a crop of articles, reports, or 
books which come under the heading of assessment – a 
business which flourishes particularly in the United States 
and especially in Washington, D.C., where the number of 
“think tanks,” specialized journals, and consultants in this 
area are legion, not to mention the official and unofficial 
production of the services specialized in anti-terrorism. 
Nevertheless, a few respectable researchers, such as the 
historian Walter Laqueur, have on occasion produced 
useful texts on terrorism. But on the whole, the best 
publications, those which genuinely contributed new and 
serious consideration were, for many years, those which 
tackled the theme of terrorism but which did not make it 
their main subject, tending instead to study phenomena 
of which terrorism was an offshoot, an extreme point, a 
specific dimension of a more general action – such as a 
national movement or a political struggle. If, for example, 
I take the bibliography of my own book, Sociétés et ter-
rorisme, I find it easy to check that the references which 
I found the most useful are of this type. Moreover, given 
the lack of any great investment in the social sciences, it 
is perhaps in literature that the most informative texts on 
terrorism are to be found – one only has to read Dos-
toyevsky to realize this.
Finally, if terrorism is an “illegitimate” subject it is also 
certainly because it refers to forms of action which are 
themselves “illegitimate” and which correspond to 
methods of political action and repression which are 
themselves somewhat unsavory. The term “terrorism” is 
indeed particularly negative, there is nothing noble about 
it, and it is even used to discredit or to criminalize those 
to whom it is applied. I only know of one period in which 
the players have sometimes used this term to describe 
themselves without the slightest qualms: that of Russian 
populism and its Socialist Revolutionary extensions, such 
as Vera Zasulich who wounded a Russian officer known 
for his brutality towards detainees. She declared to the 
jury (who moreover acquitted her): “I am not a criminal, 
I’m a terrorist.” Or again, twenty years later, Boris Sav-
inkov – one of the Socialist Revolutionary leaders in the 
Russia of the beginning of the twentieth century – who 
wrote the extremely interesting Memoirs of a Terrorist.3 
The ill repute which is associated with the use of the term 
“terrorism” turns it into a common-sense category which 
it is not easy to transform into a sociological category. It is 
all the more difficult to effect a transformation of this type 
given that the very image of the terrorist is usually that of 
the barbarian, the madman, or the pathological personal-
ity – which various apparently scientific pieces of work 
periodically labor in vain to prove. To speak of terrorism 
in different terms, for example to seek meaning behind 
the apparent madness, involves at the outset coming up 
against a consensus which massively rejects any attempt to 
understand in this area – in common parlance, endeavor-
ing to understand and explain terrorism is said to be a way 
of justifying it. However, in colloquiums and specialized 
publications it is frequently stated that it is impossible to 
resolve an inescapable difficulty, namely that those who 
are terrorists in the eyes of some are freedom fighters or 
resistance fighters in the eyes of others. But in fact this is 
just one more way of not approaching the phenomenon 
scientifically and of refraining from offering a satisfactory 
definition.
The move from everyday vocabulary to a scientific concept 
is an extremely delicate operation here and one which 
implies a capacity for distancing and reflexivity which 
it is difficult to promote. Indeed, at least until the 1990s, 
terrorism was characterized by the fact that it only hit the 
headlines occasionally. Outside periods of intense terrorist 
activity there was no social or political demand for it to be 
studied and researchers were not encouraged to take an 
interest in it. In periods when bombs were exploding, or 
when there were numerous attacks, hijacking of planes or 
3 Cf. his memoirs, Boris Savinkov, Memoirs of a terrorist.
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kidnappings, the researcher was approached by the media, 
or even by political leaders, and enjoined to explain what 
was at stake, hic et nunc, and therefore to act as an expert 
much more than to suggest that a degree of distance be 
taken, to analyze the long-term processes which may have 
led to this extreme violence or to reflect on the scope of 
the term “terrorism.” Moreover, the anti-terrorist action of 
public authorities, usually accompanied by a high degree 
of media exposure, encouraged the proliferation of expert 
competences, not all strictly serious, which resulted in 
scholarly production being drowned in a sea of a usually 
mediocre specialized literature and of being discredited 
– in this respect, bad money drove out the good. Journal-
ists surfing on the wave of the news; consultants informed 
by secret service agents; lawyers, magistrates, and political 
personalities all of whom were fairly manipulative and 
themselves working in a closed circuit obtaining their 
information from journalists and consultants; essayists 
carried along by ideology more than by the concern to 
produce documented, in-depth knowledge, etc.: all sorts 
of actors contributed to making of “terrorism” an object 
which appeared to belong to people other than social sci-
ence researchers.
All this can only go to reinforce the idea that, ultimately, 
in matters of terrorism, those who know do not speak 
and those who speak do not know. This remark can be 
extended by another which is dependent on the very 
functions of anti-terrorist discourse: as I observed dur-
ing a research visit to Washington, D.C., in the mid-1980s, 
anti-terrorism is in fact a set of proposals which are the 
outcome of the interaction of all sorts of players, pres-
sure groups, government agencies, the media, etc., whose 
interests are not restricted, and this is the least one can 
say, to the battle against this special form of violence alone. 
Understanding what is said about terrorism and the way 
in which it should be countered in a given society may be, 
consequently, a way of seeking to understand how this 
society functions, much more than an analysis of terror-
ism properly speaking.4
2. The Concept of Terrorism
But today terrorism seems to be established on a long-term 
basis as a danger and, frequently, as a reality which is 
sufficiently important to justify systematic consideration 
in which the social sciences must fully participate. It is ac-
knowledged that in confronting a challenge of this sort it 
ceases to be a minor or an “illegitimate” subject. Now it in 
no way suffices to advance serious and well-documented 
historical analyses: it is essential to go to the core of the 
theoretical difficulties which hinder its understanding and 
to formulate the concept.
Formulation of the concept must enable us to go beyond 
the insoluble difficulty which consists in relativizing in 
advance any judgment about a “terrorist” experience by 
bearing in mind that, in opposition to those who hold this 
view, there are those who refute this perception and, on 
the contrary, place value on violence. In fact, this aporia 
functions by combining two defining elements which it is 
urgent to separate analytically even if it means articulat-
ing them at a later stage in the approach specific to terror-
ist experiences. Terrorism must be approached from the 
angle of the methods to which it resorts, on the one hand, 
and on the other, from that of the meaning which it is 
endeavoring to express, but also, as we shall see, subvert.
In the first instance, terrorism falls within the sphere of 
instrumental action; it can be defined as the implementa-
tion of tools and resources whose costs are modest in rela-
tion to the effects expected by its promoter. As this, terror-
ism frequently faces states that rely on military and police 
forces while it will itself use only cheap, easily accessible 
tools that it can find within the market and the civil 
society, and that usually belong to very narrow repertories. 
Each organization has its own tools, which will appear as 
4 Michel Wieviorka, “Defining and Implementing 
Foreign Policy: the US Experience in Anti-Ter-
rorism,” in The 1988–1989 Annual on Terrorism, 
ed. Yonah Alexander and H Foxman (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), 71–201; cf. also 
Michel Wieviorka, “France Faced with Terrorism,” 
Terrorism 14 (3): 157–70.
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a kind of signature in the eyes of specialists in charge of 
identifying the authors of an attack. The notion of “terror-
ist methods” cannot be understood as a list of techniques, 
since they vary from one case to another. It can only mean 
a huge disproportion, an important asymmetry, since 
mobilizing limited resources will enable the terrorists to 
deal with political powers that master powerful resources. 
With a few hand arms or a few kilos of explosives, for 
example, a terrorist group can destabilize a regime, put an 
end to a governing power, and in short obtain results out 
of all proportion to the means used. This first part of the 
definition of terrorism has the merit of stressing its highly 
rational character. In this instance, the actor is capable of 
elaborating a strategy, of calculating, of equipping himself 
with tools which are within his reach and, if need be, of 
putting a state which is infinitely more powerful than he 
is in difficulty. He almost appears to be more intelligent 
in this respect than the authorities he confronts. Thus, 
while for years American strategists were working out 
very sophisticated approaches and imagining particularly 
elaborate scenarios of nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological 
terrorism, the perpetrators of the attacks on September 11, 
2001 (9/11 as it is now known in the United States) boarded 
commercial aeroplanes after having acquired elementary 
skills in flying, their only arms being simple penknives or 
cutters.
Instrumental rationality is not foreign to the world of 
terrorists. But we still have to introduce here a recent ele-
ment which complicates analysis of this dimension of the 
phenomenon: the increase in suicide attacks. For when 
the terrorist does more than risk his life, when he gives 
it, without reserve, and when that is at least partly due to 
a personal decision, it then becomes difficult to speak of a 
modest investment out of all proportion to the expected 
results. In this instance, rationality can no longer be the 
object of a calculation of the cost/benefit type, except if we 
consider that the choice of suicide operations and the deci-
sion of who will be the martyr are attributable not to those 
who are going to commit suicide but to the leaders of the 
organizations who either manipulate or instrumentalize 
people who are prepared to kill themselves. Now, even if 
the vast majority of Islamist suicide operations imply an 
organized process,5 research, and we shall come back to 
this point, precludes us from systematically and exclusive-
ly postulating this scenario of absence of autonomy and 
meaning for the person who is going to commit suicide.
This brings us straight to the second constituent dimen-
sion of terrorism, which is its relationship to meaning. As 
a very specific kind of political violence, the political di-
mensions of terrorism are permanently fueled or invaded 
by other logics where meaning is lost or overloaded by 
new elements, religious for instance. This leads violence 
to be either infrapolitical (and then dominated by eco-
nomic or purely criminal goals), or to be metapolitical 
(and then dominated by religious goals, including life after 
death). The approaches which reduce the phenomenon to 
its dimensions of instrumental violence alone, of means 
therefore at the service of an end, must never allow us to 
forget that, from the point of view of the protagonist, the 
terrorist act is meaningful. Whether the actors express 
themselves or not, their action is imbued with meaning for 
them. The characteristic of these meanings is that they are 
always different from what they would be if they were not 
implemented violently. In terrorism, the resort to violence 
is always associated with distortions or deviations when 
compared with the meaning of the same action without 
the use of arms, explosives, etc. 
In some cases what strikes the researcher first and fore-
most is the loss of meaning purely and simply, with the 
terrorist acting because the meaning escapes him and he 
wishes to maintain it artificially. Thus, for example, in 
Italy in the 1970s and 1980s there was a wave of extreme 
left terrorism in which the only issue was the working-
class movement even though the latter was declining and 
losing its historical centrality and the workers no longer 
5 Cf. for example Robert Pape, who suggests the 
figure of 95 percent in The Strategic Logic of Suicide 
Terrorism. And, by the same author, the book often 
quoted Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide 
Terrorism (2005). 
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recognized themselves in the slightest in this violence. 
The greater the gulf between the figure of reference – the 
working-class movement – and the discourse claiming 
to represent this figure at the highest revolutionary level, 
the greater the limitless violence of the bearers of this 
discourse. This loss of meaning can lead to the nihilism 
of the “devils” so well described by Dostoyevsky. Though 
we do have to be careful here and not apply this schema 
too rapidly to the facts: the philosopher André Glucksman 
(2002) was mistaken in interpreting the 9/11 attacks in the 
light of this model, because, in this instance, the violence 
was not so much lacking in meaning as simply overflow-
ing with it.
In other cases, what we see is the impossibility of continu-
ing to reconcile elements of meaning which could formerly 
function together without great difficulty. Thus ETA, the 
organization for independence in the Basque country, 
emerged under Franco and expressed the shared hopes 
of those who wished to liberate the (Basque) nation from 
the oppression of Franco, to end the political dictator-
ship, and to express the expectations of a working class 
which was powerful at the time but severely repressed. At 
the time, the violence of ETA was limited and primarily 
symbolic. Then democracy was reinstituted, the Basque 
nation obtained a considerable measure of autonomy and 
deindustrialization ended the centrality of working-class 
struggles. It was at this point that the violence of ETA took 
a genuinely terrorist turn which at times knew no limits; 
it was the only way of maintaining alive the myth of an 
action which spoke at one and the same time in the name 
of an oppressed nation, a working class with no voice and 
mobilization against the repression of the Spanish state 
which was said to be democratic merely in appearance.
In yet other cases violence is associated with an overload 
of meaning in which the actors attribute a religious, meta-
political meaning to their political and social expectations 
– this is the case, to which we shall return, in instances 
of terrorism linked to radical Islamism. On occasion, the 
terrorist act includes, or liberates, dimensions of gratu-
itous violence or sadism which have nothing to do with 
the meanings of the action and which have no import of 
an instrumental type – for example when the guards of 
people who have been kidnapped, and who will be liber-
ated in return for the payment of a ransom, indulge in 
humiliating and cruel practices.
Violence seems to be more instrumental and there is less 
justification to talk in terms of terrorism when meaning 
is not entirely lost or is closer to what it would be with-
out resort to violence. Terrorism therefore appears in all 
its conceptual purity when, on the contrary, it no longer 
maintains the slightest link with the real world, or with 
a social, national, cultural, or political figure of reference 
which might be recognizable in its actions. The notion of 
“pure” terrorism may appear strange. It is true that in reali-
ty the phenomenon is political. But the concept, in its pure 
form, is no longer political. In fact this concept is related 
to the extreme aspect of the phenomenon, when the logics 
of releasing or overloading meaning reach their ultimate 
conclusion, cease to have any relationship to reality, when 
violence becomes its own end. At that stage, terrorism is 
the just a question of military or police repression towards 
groups that have no other legitimacy than the one they 
themselves decide to have. But in real life the phenomenon 
is usually “impure,” it manages to maintain some contact 
– even if very limited – with a population it refers to, a so-
cial reality, some sympathy or comprehension within the 
people. Therefore it is this practical “impurity” that makes 
it political.
Terrorism is in keeping with its concept in extreme – per-
haps even exceptional – cases in which only its perpetrator 
is capable of conferring a legitimate meaning to its action 
and in which no figure of reference whatsoever can be rec-
ognized. In all other cases it is “impure,” imperfect, and 
incomplete. When al Qaeda organized the 9/11 attacks, it 
aroused revulsion throughout the world, but also guarded 
approbation amongst the Muslim masses in some coun-
tries: in these instances we cannot speak of “pure” terror-
ism. When the Italian Red Brigades killed employers or 
political leaders in the name of a working-class proletariat 
which rejected their violence and when, apart from their 
members, they had no symbolic or ideological recogni-
tion, they became genuinely terrorist – it is moreover at 
that point that they weaken and become vulnerable to the 
repression which will put an end to this experience.
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3. Classical Terrorism
As a historical reality, terrorism is like many other social 
or political phenomena: it has undergone considerable 
transformations since the period between 1960 and 1980. 
To be more precise, it has moved from the classical era 
to the global era. Some observers challenge this image of 
distinct change or break. Hans Magnus Enzensberger, for 
example, while not minimizing the innovations brought 
in by radical Islamism which has, in his words, “replaced 
the omniscient and all powerful Central Committee 
by a flexible network,” insists on recalling that “mod-
ern terrorism is a European invention dating from the 
nineteenth century… In recent years,” he points out, “its 
main source of inspiration has been the extreme left ter-
rorism of the 1960s and 1970s” (Enzensberger 2006, 29f.). 
He considers that the techniques of the Islamists, their 
symbols, the style of their communiqués, etc., borrow 
on a wide scale from the extreme left groups of the past. 
One might add, to go for a moment in his direction, that 
the practice of suicide is not a novelty in terrorism. The 
terrorists of the end of the nineteenth and beginning of 
the twentieth century took risks which verged on suicide 
in approaching their target with a bomb, a pistol, or a 
knife. Bobby Sands in 1981, other members of the (Irish) 
IRA, Ulrike Meinhof in 1976, Andreas Baader in 1977, 
and other members of the (German) Red Army Fraction 
all committed suicide in prison – although it is true that 
their gestures did not involve the deaths of anyone other 
than themselves.
 
The fact remains that Enzensberger himself, a few lines 
later in the book quoted above, weakens the thesis of his-
torical continuity by noting that the Islamist terrorists “are 
in reality pure products of the globalized world which they 
are fighting” and that “in comparison to their predecessors, 
they have gone considerably further, not only in the tech-
niques which they use but in their use of the media” (ibid., 
31). While it would be absurd to postulate an absolute break, 
it nevertheless does seem to us more relevant to insist on 
the elements of a move from one era to another, rather than 
those which indicate a degree of continuity. This move can 
be observed in material terms by analyzing the forms and 
the meanings which terrorism assumed yesterday and by 
comparing them with present-day forms and meanings. It 
also involves the considerable changes in the categories 
which we can now use in considering this phenomenon.
In the period 1960 – 1980 terrorism came in the main 
within the province of the analytical framework of the 
nation-state and its extension, international relations. 
Within the nation-state – or, at least, the sovereign state 
– it corresponded to three major registers. It could be on 
the extreme left, the extreme right, or nationalist and in 
favor of independence. 
By far the most widespread expression of extreme left ter-
rorism was played out in Italy, but it was also to be found 
in numerous other societies in varying stages of industri-
alization: West Germany with the Red Army Faction and 
the Revolutionary Cells, France with Action Directe, Japan 
with its Red Army, Belgium with the Revolutionary Com-
munist Cells, Greece, Portugal, etc.). It was the outcome 
of what I termed, at the time, an inversion in which the 
perpetrators of violence, in a deviation of post-68 leftism, 
took over the categories of Marxism-Leninism to subvert 
them in the name of a working-class proletariat which 
they in no way represented. In each instance terrorism 
challenged the authority of the state, even if in some cases 
the state had endeavored to become international and to 
establish itself in a space other than national, and even if 
it did denounce American imperialism in no uncertain 
terms. Extreme right terrorism, which was less widespread, 
was also prompted by projects to take over the state, often 
associated with the presence in the machinery of the 
states concerned of sectors which were themselves open 
to projects of this type. Finally, still internal to sovereign 
states, terrorism could be the mode of action of nationalist 
movements wishing to force the independence of a nation, 
where it might also be a question for them of awakening by 
means of violence. In Europe, the Basque and Irish move-
ments were thus characterized by their resort to the armed 
struggle and by comparable forms of organization with, 
in particular, the same type of tensions between bellicose 
“military” rationales and “political” rationales which were 
more open to negotiation.
Elsewhere, international terrorism was in the main carried 
out by actors claiming to adhere to the Palestinian cause, 
whether it be at the center – for example with the killing of 
Israeli athletes carried out by El Fatah in 1972 in the Olym-
pic village in Munich – or on the periphery with, in these 
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instance, the intervention of groups possibly manipulated 
by state “sponsors” (Syria, Libya, Iraq) endeavoring to 
weaken the central rationale of the PLO and to prevent any 
negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 
some respects, the terrorism of the ASALA (Secret Army 
for the Liberation of Armenia) resembled that of the Pal-
estinian groups on which it was modeled in particular as, 
like them, it found in Lebanon in crisis a territory propi-
tious to its short-lived prosperity.
The specificity of classical terrorism, that of the period 
between 1960 and 1980, is that it unfolded in a “West-
phalian” world, as some political analysts call it today – a 
world which it was possible and legitimate to approach 
in terms of the categories of what Ulrich Beck (2006) 
calls “methodological nationalism.” Terrorism originated 
within societies which are themselves established within 
states; it conveyed political and ideological deviations 
which referred to projects for taking power at state level or 
for the construction of a state; and it was conveyed by an 
avant-garde who saw themselves as being the direction of 
history, the working class, and the nation. In counterpart, 
the campaign against terrorism was an affair in which 
each of the states concerned became involved for itself 
– which did not exclude appeals to international solidarity. 
Classical terrorism was conceived of and described as be-
ing primarily a danger threatening states, their order, and 
possibly, their territorial integrity.
4. ‘Global’ Terrorism
The 9/11 attacks revealed what could in fact be glimpsed 
almost ten years previously: the entry into the ‘global’ era 
of terrorism. This era had been inaugurated by various 
episodes bearing the mark of radical Islamism with, in 
particular, the first attempted Islamist attack in New York 
in 1993, even then aimed at the World Trade Center towers, 
or again the hijacking of an Air France plane in Algiers 
in December 1994 by Islamists who planed to crash the 
plane on Paris – a hijacking which was followed a few 
months later by a series of attacks in France falling within 
the same ‘global’ rationale since international dimensions 
(the extension of the Algerian Islamist struggle outside 
Algerian national space) were combined with dimensions 
internal to French society (crisis in the banlieues, social 
exclusion, and the transformation of the experience of rac-
ism into violence).
It is even possible to go further back in time to find the 
first signs of ‘global’ terrorism in the attacks using a 
suicide bomber in a delivery truck which destroyed the 
American Embassy in Beirut (April 1983) and then the bar-
racks of the French contingent of the multinational force 
in Lebanon and the local headquarters of the United States 
Marines (October 1983): many believe that these were the 
first actions of the Hezbollah, a movement which de-
scribed itself as planning an Islamist revolution through-
out the region, which also intended to destroy the state of 
Israel and which, from then on, was capable of mobilizing 
people destined to kill themselves in their action.
Whatever the case may be, the ‘globalization’ of terror-
ism was demonstrated in spectacular fashion by the 9/11 
attacks. “Globalization” means that the phenomenon can 
no longer be thought of in the categories of “methodologi-
cal nationalism” as it blurs the classical frontiers between 
rationales which are internal to sovereign states and the 
external or international rationales. The perpetrators of 
the 9/11 attack circulated in what had become a global 
space, their career paths took them from the society in 
which they were born, in this instance Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt, to other societies, Sudan, Pakistan and Afghanistan 
where they met, were formed and trained, creating links 
of solidarity which again fanned out to form networks 
all over the world and in which they had the advantage of 
total freedom of action in the state of the Taliban, which 
they subjugated. They were at ease in several countries in 
Europe – in Germany, where some of them attended uni-
versity; in the England of “Londonistan” and its mosques, 
where the most radical opinions were expressed freely; and 
in the French banlieues. These players, contrary to popular 
opinion, were not the spokespersons of an actual, to some 
extent traditional, community from which they issued 
forth expressing directly the expectations of the commu-
nity; on the contrary, they were the products of rootless-
ness and were far from a community of this type; they 
were the products of a transnational neo-umma, to use the 
words of Farhad Khosrokhavar (2002), of an imaginary 
community which tended to be constructed in the poorer 
areas of the major ‘global’ cities in the modern world rath-
er than in traditional rural areas. There were rationales 
in their action which mirrored the most modern possible 
capitalism – Bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, was even 
said to have committed the offense of “insider dealing” by 
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speculating on the stock exchange on the consequences of 
the attacks which his organization was preparing.
Actors of this type are highly flexible. Functioning in 
networks, they know how to connect and disconnect 
themselves without difficulty and, instrumental rationality 
being to the fore, they use the most advanced communi-
cation technologies, beginning with the Internet. Their 
terrorism is also ‘global’ by definition and is not restricted 
to a single state in which it would be a question of taking 
power, or separating therefrom. Their aims are indeed 
global and go even further than the context of the world 
in which we live, to be projected into the next. Having 
broken with the traditional forms of community life, their 
Islamism, inseparable from the notion of jihad – the holy 
war – transcends national frontiers and aims – including 
through martyrdom and therefore through sacred death 
– at destroying the West which at one and the same time 
fascinates them and excludes and despises Islam and the 
Muslims.
The attacks of September 11, 2001, were not the first expres-
sion of this terrorism perpetrated by transnational actors 
and probably to be transcended in future, but a climac-
tic moment, an extreme case. For thereafter, numerous 
attacks were made in the name of al Qaeda, or at least 
associated with this organization, but without present-
ing the same transnational purity, in other words, mix-
ing world level dimensions with others, more classically 
established in the context of the state targeted. Moreover it 
is to these hybrid expressions, which conjugate world and 
supranational aspects with aspects which are internal to 
the states concerned that the idea of globalization of ter-
rorism best applies. Whether it be a question of the attacks 
in Riyadh, Casablanca, and Istanbul in 2003, of those in 
Madrid (March 2004), or yet again in London (July 2005), 
on each occasion, and along lines which vary from one 
experience to another, the actors combine the two dimen-
sions which constitute ‘global’ terrorism. On one hand at 
least some of them are at one and the same time to some 
extent immersed in the society in which they act, and 
are then subjected to rationales of social exclusion and 
contempt and express a strong sense of not finding their 
place in this society, or else they express their rejection of 
its international policies. On the other hand they are bear-
ers of transnational, religious rationales and if need be are 
connected to global networks. They are therefore simulta-
neously part of an imaginary community of believers with 
no material basis and of a real community, for example of 
Moroccan immigrants (in Spain) or Pakistanis (in Eng-
land), or yet again of the impoverished masses living in 
the most deprived areas of Casablanca and Istanbul. Their 
action is neither solely internal and classical nor solely 
transnational, it is both at once. This moreover is why the 
answers to ‘global’ terrorism themselves combine the two 
dimensions, one being military ensuring defense in rela-
tion to the outside world and the other involving policing 
and internal security.
But is ‘global’ terrorism really new? In the past, terror-
ists could have transnational trajectories and appear to 
be far from having solid roots in the national society they 
come from. For instance, the three Japanese terrorists who 
killed twenty-six persons at the airport in Lod, Israel, on 
May 30, 1972, were acting in name of the Palestinian cause 
– nothing to do with Japan. And the German activists 
belonging to terrorist organizations that joined Palestin-
ian extremist groups or collaborated with “sponsor states” 
(i.e. Iraq, Syria, Libya) during the seventies did not relate 
their acts to Germany. There was some transnationalism, 
and some networking then too. But what was at stake was 
international support for a national cause, and not ‘global’ 
action. And networks, which many experts considered to 
be organized from communist countries, could exist only 
due to the will or tolerance of some states. 
However, in some cases of “global terrorism” the transna-
tional dimension itself is weak, even non-existent, and ter-
rorist action is mainly restricted to its classical dimensions. 
The suicide attacks by the Palestinians against targets in 
Israel are of this type. The practice of martyrdom is an in-
novation in Palestinian action and the latter only recently 
became Islamist. But above all, this violence proceeds di-
rectly from a specific community – the populations in the 
territories placed under the control of the Palestinian Au-
thority – and the references to Islam remain subordinate 
to the national struggle. The transnational dimensions of 
the action are of little import and, while it is possible to 
speak of terrorism, it must be clearly understood that the 
latter remains classical and not global.
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‘Global’ terrorism unfolds in a space which is therefore 
bounded by two poles. At one extremity, it is purely trans-
national – this was the case with the September 11, 2001, 
attacks; and at the other extremity, it is classical, at least as 
far as its framework of reference is concerned – this is the 
case with the Palestinian attacks in Israeli territory.
Is this ‘global’ terrorism the monopoly of radical Is-
lamism? It is true that terrorist players other than Mus-
lim do exist today in the world and that many armed 
movements, be they nationalist, ethnic, or the product 
of another religion (Hinduism, for example), do resort 
thereto. But radical Islamism is the only one to combine 
global, metapolitical aims and a possible foothold within 
a sovereign state in various parts of the world. As a result, 
this leaves less space for violent actors other than Islamist, 
as was seen in spectacular fashion in Spain: the terrible 
attacks on March 11, 2004, in Madrid (191 persons killed) 
were in the first instance attributed by the government 
to ETA before it became clear that they were the work of 
North African migrants. Not only did José Maria Aznar’s 
Partido Popular lose the elections which took place a 
few days later for having wrongly accused ETA, but the 
Basque separatist organization found itself in a way the 
victim of Islamist terrorism, forced as they also were to 
refute such extreme violence. Henceforth their legitimacy 
to resort to arms or explosives was weakened. For this 
reason it has been said that al Qaeda, by its intervention 
in Spain, could signify the beginning of the historical 
decline of ETA.
More generally, if we consider classical terrorism, that of 
the 1960s and 1970s, one may have an image of a form of 
fragmentation. The rationales of yesteryear were indeed 
political, obsessed, it was said, by taking state power or 
by the setting up of a new state. In the present-day world 
terrorist action has either become more than political, 
overdetermined by its dimensions of sacred world-level 
struggle, with no possible negotiation – radical Islamism 
reigns here, it is metapolitical – or else less than political, 
concerned in these instances with economic profit, as is 
the case, for example, of many of the guerrilla movements 
in Latin America, which become infrapolitical forces. This 
does not prevent nationalist, or comparable, movements 
from continuing to exist, still liable to resort, classically, to 
terrorism, but necessarily restricted and reduced to their 
local-level issues.
5. The Subjectivity of the Victims and of the Actors
In the classical age, no great concern was shown for the 
victims of terrorism other than to hastily lament them. A 
count was made of the dead but the number of wounded 
and traumatized was in the main unknown. Hardly 
anything in the way of either immediate or long-term 
care was provided. After an attack or a hijacking, once the 
emotional effects had settled there was very little recogni-
tion for those whom extreme violence had left in pain, des-
titute and often alone. Terrorism was primarily a problem 
for the state concerned, for its politics and its diplomacy, 
to the extent that in the name of reasons of state, it often 
happened, especially in matters of international terrorism 
and including in the most advanced democracies, that it 
was impossible to obtain the completion of serious inqui-
ries and that the courts really and truly fulfill their role. In 
the words of Françoise Rudetzki, the founder of the NGO 
SOS Attentats-SOS Terrorisme:
Twelve years after the hijacking of the Airbus 300 [in 
Algiers in December 1994, already referred to above] we 
still do not know the true perpetrators or who ordered 
the operation… I know it and I check it on each oc-
casion, reasons of state prevent any inquiry. Even for 
the dreadful attacks in 1986 the “henchmen,” Tunisian 
mercenaries, have been judged, whereas those who gave 
the orders, the Iranians who are really responsible, have 
never been judged (Rudetzki 2006, 14f.).
But today, thanks precisely to the mobilization of people 
like Françoise Rudetzki, who created her association in 
1983 after the attack at the Grand Véfour Restaurant in 
Paris, in which she was gravely wounded, the victims are 
beginning to be recognized and compensated by a fund 
set up by law (this is the situation in France), taken care 
of at once, including their psychological suffering, and 
the courts are under greater pressure from public opinion 
than in the past to carry out inquiries to completion. Now, 
as Françoise Rudetzki very rightly observes, “recognition 
by the courts is essential to enable the victims to recon-
struct themselves. The trial is the last phase in the process 
which will enable them to emerge from the status of vic-
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tim, which is painful, uncomfortable, and where some-
times people are made to feel they are to blame” (ibid., 15).
This evolution is part of a much wider tendency of pres-
ent-day societies to take an interest in individuals, in 
subjects whose physical or intellectual integrity is affected 
by violence individually or collectively, in the present or in 
the past, which has marked them for life. It constitutes the 
first dimension of the dramatic entry of the subject into 
any consideration and analysis of terrorism.
The second dimension is related to the terrorists them-
selves. Classically, as we have seen, their subjectivity is 
usually ignored by the analysis which either reduces this 
aspect to their calculations and their instrumental ratio-
nality, or else strives to show the pathological nature of the 
terrorist personality. In my work in the 1980s I had begun 
to criticize this tendency seriously and even suggested a 
reversal of the conventional discourse. It is the prolonged 
experience of illegality, of living amongst themselves 
in small exclusive groups, of the practice of the armed 
struggle, and of the right which they assume to dispose 
of the lives of others that shapes the potential terrorist 
personality. This is not so much a point of departure and 
therefore an explanatory element of violent action but in-
stead a culmination, the consequence of deviations which 
have resulted in the practice of violence. But the present-
day generalization of suicide attacks forces us to go much 
further in our consideration of the subjectivity of terrorist 
actors even if numerous specialists strive to prioritize the 
categories of instrumental, calculated, tactical action in 
Islamist suicide attacks.6 This mode of approach may be 
relevant if it is a question of the organizations implied but 
ceases to be so when it is a question of individuals; it is dif-
ficult to perceive the nature of the cost/benefit calculation 
they might be envisaging.
In the first instance, the issue is one of rejection of an 
elementary sociologism. Contrary to the commonly held 
belief, most radical Islamists, those who best personify 
the image of ‘global’ terrorism and who are ready to give 
their lives, do not necessarily come from the most so-
cially deprived circles, they are not all underprivileged, 
some also belong to the educated middle classes. They are 
Muslims – on occasion converts – who know the West as 
a result of living, or of having lived there or, at the very 
least, from having been confronted with it, if only through 
the media. They do not constitute a homogeneous set of 
people, and while they may share important features – the 
very pronounced sense of humiliation which must be 
ended, hatred of Jews, the conviction of being at war with 
the West – it is nevertheless possible to distinguish, on the 
basis of the subjectivity of each individual, several major 
types of actors. Thus, Farhad Khosrokhavar, a researcher 
who is outstandingly well-qualified since he has studied 
young Muslims in the French banlieues (suburbs), as well 
as Muslim detainees in British prisons and elsewhere in 
Europe, revolutionary Iran, and Islam in various countries 
of the Middle East, suggests that we distinguish four types 
of jihadists which he names Islamo-nihilist, Islamo-ple-
thorist, Islamo-individualist, and Islamo-fundamentalist.7 
In an earlier book Farhad Khosrokhavar was concerned 
with: “how to understand this drive until death of groups 
of men who kill themselves and also target the death of 
others” (id. , 331). His explanation is as follows: the move 
to ‘global’ martyrdom takes place primarily in situations 
where the big city and the loss of bearings creates a sense 
of loss of self and of disarray amongst the migrants and 
enhances the project of a world-level form of Islam in 
which the difficulty of participating in modernity and the 
feeling of being faced with a sharp rejection of Islam com-
bine in an explosive mixture of revolt and hatred.
6 “Suicide bombing is the signature tactic of the 
fourth or ‘religious wave’ of modern terrorism” 
read the opening lines of the editor’s preface to an 
important book on the subject, “No contemporary 
terrorist method is more important to understand” 
(Pedahzur 2006, XV).
7 Farhad Khosrokhavar, Quand Al Qaïda parle: 
Témoignages derrière les barreaux (Paris: Gras-
challenges the West which deprives him of the 
possibility of this type of fulfillment; finally, 
the “Islamo-fundamentalist” comes from a neo-
communitarian group which has provided him 
with “a closed conception of the religious” (ibid., 
344), he turns from fundamentalism, usually a 
factor of reassurance, to terrorism as a result of 
radicalization which is due to humiliation or to 
repression.
set, 2006). The “Islamo-nihilist” is an individual 
without roots, “in search of an Islam which will 
provide an existential answer to the sense of 
misfortune which overcomes him” (ibid., 332); the 
“Islamo-plethorist” has a “much greater religious 
foundation,” he is educated, and gives “a religious 
meaning to all his acts” in his life (ibid., 334–35); 
the “Islamo-individualist” would like to be 
fulfilled as a believer and as an individual and 
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From the moment one adopts this type of approach, the 
terrorist constructs his subjectivity as he lives an unusual 
experience, a path which brings him face to face with the 
‘globalized’ world as described by Saskia Sassen (2001), 
which reinforces the justification of our use of the term 
‘global’ in describing it. Marc Sageman, who established 
a corpus of biographical data on 172 participants in the 
Salafi jihad, also stresses the diasporic nature of this 
experience (84 percent joined the jihad in a country other 
than the one in which they were born). He notes that they 
are on the whole educated, many of them being trained 
in technical subjects (medicine, architecture, engineer-
ing, information technology, and business); three-quar-
ters of them are in the “professions” (physicists, lawyers, 
engineers, teachers) or are “semi-professionals” (busi-
ness-men, information technologists, etc.), and very few 
have had a genuine religious education. In the words of 
this psychiatrist who was for long associated with the CIA, 
it is “this combination of technical education and lack 
of religious sophistication that made them vulnerable to 
an extreme interpretation of Islam” (Sageman 2006, 127). 
Marc Sageman, in a manner fairly comparable to the work 
of Khosrokhavar, sets out a typology of trajectories which 
lead to jihad, in which he distinguishes seven types. Here 
too, the actors are defined in terms of their subjectivity, 
their endeavors to construct themselves as actors and to 
give meaning to their experience. Like Khosrokhavar he 
also asks the question: “how do they come to a point at 
which they wish to kill ordinary people and themselves at 
the same time?” He stresses the social dynamics at work in 
the small groups of jihadists, their sense of moral superi-
ority, and their belief in a collective future. He speaks of a 
change in values – from the secular to the religious, from 
the immediate to the long term, from traditional morality 
to a new morality and, there again, to the overpowering 
hatred of the Jews.
Approaches of this type tackle the question of subjectiva-
tion and desubjectivation, a dialectic which leads to ter-
rorism and martyrdom; they give us a view of the sources 
of commitment and the existential meaning assumed by 
belief, the extent of anti-Semitism and of the demoniza-
tion of the West. The terrorist is neither reduced to some 
sort of social role, possibly even an essence, nor to his 
calculations, decisive as these may be. Nor is he reduced 
to the indoctrination or manipulation implemented by the 
organization which sends him to his death, as if he had no 
personal reason for acting – as if he was not a subject. To 
understand his action we are invited to take an interest in 
him as a subject, to endeavor to know and to understand 
his intentions, his representations, and his religiosity.
The sociology of ‘global’ terrorism thus creates a relation 
between what, at first sight, may seem extremely distant: 
on one hand, the major transformations in the world, 
transnational rationales and the way in which they link up 
with rationales which are more restricted because they are 
rooted within the framework of a state; and, on the other 
hand, the subjectivity of the actors which borders on the 
most intimate, their most private personal experiences, 
their dreams and their despair. But the creation of this 
relation, which is not unlike a balancing act, is possible 
and necessary quite simply because the subjectivity of the 
actors – the way in which they mentally construct them-
selves, produce their personal and collective imaginary 
world – owes a great deal to their exposure to the most 
‘global’ modernity, to their belonging but also to their per-
egrinations in the universe of globalization which simulta-
neously fascinates and rejects them.
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